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 Abstract 
What is the relationship between cultural difference and global cooperation, and what 
challenges and opportunities does this relationship pose for cooperation research? This 
paper examines how culture is a potential resource for global cooperation while 
grappling with its enigmas and ambiguities. It explores the paradoxes of culture to 
argue that the partly unknowable character of the concept ‘culture’ may be an 
advantage for cooperation research rather than a problem to be solved. The paper 
casts culture and cultures as examples of a wider class of ‘relational’ phenomena that 
arise through interaction and that rely upon this interaction for their standing. This 
proposition foregrounds relations over entities, becoming over being, and dynamism 
over fixity in line with a range of contemporary philosophical developments and the 
burgeoning of interest in relationality. Thinking of culture in relational terms offers a 
way of modulating culture; of simultaneously respecting cultural difference and 
allowing that difference is a shared human resource. Relationality can be deployed to 
help facilitate cooperation by re-opening interaction within political, social, economic, 
and institutional arrangements, including through processes for generating relational 
and cooperative effects have been developed in the field of conflict resolution.  
However, doing so requires that the fields most obviously related to global cooperation 
(political science, international relations, and global governance) engage relational 
approaches at the limits of the precise sciences and through philosophy, religion, and 
non-western cultural traditions.  
Keywords  
Culture, relationality,  cultural difference, conflict resolution, global governance, 
cooperation research, chaos theory, non–linearity, unknowability, becoming, non-
western traditions 
Author 
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Culture, ‘Relationality’, and Global 
Cooperation1 
 
 
Morgan Brigg 
Introduction 
Increased globalisation and the emergence of large-scale cooperation dilemmas 
such as those posed by climate change are challenging human capacities to 
collaborate as never before. In response, many attempts to find new and improved 
forms of global cooperation are characterised by efforts to unite humanity by 
emphasising commonalities or sameness. Current efforts draw, for instance, on 
abstract reasoning, the evolutionary basis for human cooperation, or the 
development of a global cosmopolitan ethic. No doubt these are valuable 
endeavors that may be more or less fruitful. But such approaches also raise 
fundamental questions: Can we manage the scale and depth of our contemporary 
cooperation challenges primarily through the pursuit of sameness? Can we 
cooperate without the assistance of that which makes us different from each 
other? These questions in turn speak to questions about what type of knowledge is 
appropriate to the task. To be sure, we want to know more about ourselves, our 
relationships with each other and with the planet, and understandably so. But 
should we invest so directly and heavily only in well–worn ways of knowing and 
managing, applying primarily the forms of reasoning that have become 
commonplace in western scholarship? Or might these ways of knowing also risk 
blinding us to other ways of knowing that may be underappreciated resources for 
global cooperation? 
Culture occupies an apparently ambiguous position in relation to the 
phenomenon of cooperation and the foregoing issues. All humans exhibit what we 
have come to call ‘culture’, and gene–culture co–evolution seems to affirm that 
culture is crucial to our very existence.2 Most accept that culture distinguishes 
humans from other species. It would thus seem that culture speaks to humanity as 
a whole. However, culture also differentiates, creating ‘them’ and ‘us’, layers of in–
groups and out–groups and, potentially, friends and enemies. Culture clearly helps 
us to cooperate within groups, but perhaps not across them. A seemingly 
commonsense formulation, then, is that culture is a source of sameness and 
                                                          
 1 The author is grateful for generous support by the Centre for Global Cooperation Research 
(Käte Hamburger Kolleg) at the University of Duisburg‐Essen, including for the wide variety of 
exchanges that contributed to the development of this paper. Particular thanks are due to Pol 
Bargues, Wren Chadwick, David Chandler, Tobias Debiel, Volker Heins, Dirk Messner, Christian 
Meyer, Claus Leggewie, Steven Pierce, Jessica Schmidt, and Mario Schmidt. Responsibility for 
any remaining shortfalls in the text rests with the author.  
 2 Through the idea that information acquired from other members of the species through 
social means is essential for human evolution. 
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shared-ness—of values, beliefs and so on—within groups but, as the source of 
expressions of difference, it is necessarily is a source of conflict among them. 
Culture, in this straightforward formulation, helps us to cooperate with friends but 
leads us to fight with enemies.  
However, this formulation almost immediately founders. It falls foul, for instance, 
of the ways culture is deployed in intercultural exchange, where cultural difference 
among peoples is precisely the basis for cooperation among them. In such 
situations, different cultural expressions (dance, art, rituals), along with different 
languages, beliefs and so on, become the focus and vehicle for sharing and 
togetherness. At least to some extent, then, culture appears ambidextrous: able to 
help humans both articulate their differences and to come together, including 
across difference. Culture would therefore seem to be a potentially valuable 
resource for cooperation; a resource  that allows humans not only to cooperate 
through shared values and so on but also through and across difference. 
Nonetheless, culture is not a source that we regularly turn to our efforts to address 
challenges of global cooperation. Culture is, perhaps, underappreciated. 
If culture is a neglected phenomenon in the pursuit of global cooperation, this 
may be partly because it is particularly puzzling for conventional scholarly ways of 
knowing, and because it presents a challenge to dominant expectations about what 
knowledge should achieve. Culture is notoriously difficult to define, for instance. It 
is difficult to characterise or stabilise culture as a ‘thing’ in the way that social 
science usually does with ideas such as ‘society’ or ‘state’. Culture evokes ineffable 
elements of the human condition that cannot be readily dissected and known in 
technical ways. It shapes who people are in varying ways—it ‘makes’ people, in 
some respects (and to some degree)—and it is certainly difficult to devise 
experiments that measure culture in ways that satisfy the precise sciences. Indeed, 
at times culture can be diaphanous, fluid, and insubstantial; cultural currents can 
apparently go underground, even if, at other times, these same currents might re–
emerge in ways that lead people to lay down their lives for cultural recognition. 
Mainstream science, meanwhile, does not take kindly to phenomena that cannot be 
defined and at times appear insubstantial or periodically become subterranean.  
Culture also causes western scholarship to confront its own limit by bringing it 
into contact with very different ways of knowing and systems for ordering the 
world (Foucault 1970: 373–374, 376–378). Scientists and scholars want to 
comprehend; we do not wish to be told that we do not and cannot know. Culture, in 
short, is perhaps some ‘other’ kind of phenomenon. To this extent it seems that our 
inability to fully know culture and its capacity to trouble conventional scholarship 
may be among its key qualities.  
Culture presents, then, a twofold puzzle for cooperation research: Culture is a 
potential resource for global cooperation but coming to ‘know’ it appears 
somewhat out of reach of conventional social science. This paper embraces this 
puzzle through a theoretical inquiry that explores the paradoxes of culture while 
resisting the urge to fully know culture in orthodox terms. Instead, it considers 
both the prospects for turning to culture as a resource for global cooperation and 
the possibility that its apparently unknowable character may be an advantage in 
this endeavour rather than a problem to be solved. The paper develops an 
argument that culture is ‘relational’ and an example of a wider phenomenon of 
‘relationality’, the theorising of which is valuable for thinking about and informing 
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efforts to progress global cooperation. In doing so I make a ‘relational proposition’, 
positing that the conceptualisation of cultures and culture as relational phenomena 
is a theoretical maneuvre that has potential for thinking about how culture might 
be a resource for global cooperation, and for extending our ways of thinking about 
global cooperation more generally. This proposition foregrounds relations over 
entities, becoming over being, and dynamism over fixity in line with a range of 
contemporary philosophical developments and the burgeoning of interest in 
relationality. Thinking of culture in relational terms, I propose, provides ways of 
respecting cultural difference and recognising that culture is a shared human 
resource for pursuing cooperation. Meanwhile, beyond the realm of culture, 
relationality is a theoretical and analytical resource that promises to extend our 
ways of thinking about global cooperation through a wide range of social and 
political interactions.  
Culture as Unknowable Known 
Culture is a challenging phenomenon for the social sciences, perhaps even 
disconcertingly so. One indicator of ongoing puzzlement is the continued currency 
of Raymond Williams’ observation that culture is one of the ‘two or three most 
complicated words in the English language’ (1983: 87). Much serious engagement 
with culture in social science (eg, see Steinmetz 1999: 4) often begins by citing 
Williams, and indeed the picture that Williams paints is a challenging one. He 
sketches the term’s etymology and changing historical usage – including 
contradictory usages – across a number of languages and fields (1983: 87–90). He 
finds that all the earliest usages of culture refer to the tending of a specific 
process, usually the cultivation of crops or animals. This meaning is subsequently 
applied metaphorically to general human processes such that culture becomes a 
frequent synonym for civility, civilization and civilizing processes, a connotation 
that is carried over into more contemporary distinctions between ‘high’ culture 
(theatre, classical music, opera) and ‘mass’ or popular culture. The use of culture as 
a general term is then challenged in the late 18th Century by Johann Herder. 
Arguing that culture cannot be universally applied to all nations and periods, 
Herder inaugurates the idea of ‘cultures’ in the plural (1983: 89), an approach that 
gathers greater numbers of adherents in 20th Century anthropology following the 
influence of Franz Boas.  
Williams concludes his sketch by noting three broad active categories of usage: 
one that refers to general processes of ‘intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic 
development’; one that ‘indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a 
period, a group, or humanity in general’; and one which ‘describes the works and 
practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ (1983: 90). In the interests of 
synthesis and of stretching toward a commonly acceptable definition of sorts, we 
might distil Williams’ formulation to say that culture refers to the ways in which 
humans give sense to their existence, with this often involving various practices for 
making meaning of the world and human relationships with it. To extend upon this 
we can say that culture involves semiotic and affective exchanges and links among 
people that generate patterned social meaning and effects. These sets of forces 
and relations charge and empower particular ways of being, variously sanctioning, 
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facilitating and limiting behaviors and sets of actions. These in turn become the 
source for social learning and both the perpetuation and change of culture. 
Culture, in this sense, is both a system of meaning and a practice (Sewell 1999).  
Although the foregoing explication of culture might help to give a sense of this 
complex term, the very complication which Williams refers to might also give us 
reason to not proceed further down this familiar path; to pause before proceeding 
too far with the standard scholarly impulse to define culture. The incentive for 
reconsidering the search for definitional clarity might be given more impetus by 
acknowledging that clarity with respect to the term ‘culture’ is apparently hard to 
come by, as borne out in survey texts. The 1952 classic book-length study by 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions, 
concludes with an argument that culture is a multi-layered construct and 
abstraction (1952), and a more recent effort by Baldwin documents more than 300 
definitions over 87 pages while acknowledging that culture is a moving target 
(2006). These are only the most pointed efforts to engage the meaning of culture, 
and it is widely acknowledged that culture is a very challenging term to define. If 
one thing is clear about the term culture, it is that attempting to ground or justify 
analysis through definition can mire theorising culture, and perhaps the wider task 
of knowing culture, in complicated debates. The challenge that culture presents to 
standard scholarly processes of definition suggests that we might search further 
afield and perhaps in stranger places; that we might move away from definition 
rather than into its comforting embrace.  
One starting point for putting definition in question while remaining with the 
impulse that is internal to definition itself is to ask if there is possibly something 
intrinsic to ‘culture’ that confounds definition. Certainly, the fact that culture is 
bound up with questions of being and meaning evokes ineffable realms of human 
experience that seem unlikely to be fully amenable to technical precision of the 
sort  pursued by social sciences seeking to emulate ways of knowing borrowed 
from the precise or natural sciences. Processes of definition generate a certain 
power for the knower that places him/her in a position of exteriority in relation to 
the world, usually through the use of text and writing (de Certeau 1984: 134), and 
these may simply not be suitable for matters the involve the more ephemeral 
aspects of human experience. What if, then, we take this possibility further by 
turning to consider the notion that culture may be examined—as at least partly—
as an ‘unknowable known’?  
Beyond the challenges imposed by its ineffable referent, part of the reason that 
culture confounds—and part of the reason for its status as an ambiguous yet 
powerful phenomenon in scholarship—is that it is located at the frontier of the 
disciplines. As the sciences displaced religious ways of knowing from the sixteenth 
century, culture initially came to stand for the balance that could not be known. 
Michel de Certeau (1984: 6) notes that ‘ever since … [scientific work] stopped 
being theological, it has constituted the whole as its remainder … [and] this 
remainder has become what we call culture’. This remainder—whether it involve 
questions of civility, theatre and other fine arts that we call ‘high culture’ or a way 
of life—can certainly be described and commented upon, but it is not particularly 
tractable within the (otherwise) powerful calculus that emerges with 
Enlightenment thinking and gives particular priority to physical or material 
phenomena and the faculty of reason.  
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It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that when the study of culture is brought into the 
fold, so to speak, gaining its own scientific discipline, anthropology, the focus was 
initially upon subjects hitherto perceived as unknowable – on ‘other’ peoples in 
places remote from metropolitan centres. So while anthropology emerges within 
the disciplines, it initially deals with those from without, generating, in the process 
and as postcolonial scholarship informs us, both indexical and oppositional 
reference points to recognise, gauge, and practice European knowledge, society 
and selves as progressive, civilised, noble, moral, and rational (Said 1995; Stoler 
1995; Cooper and Stoler 1997; Shapiro 2004). While this knowledge has historically 
bypassed and in many cases actively disavowed the representations other people 
give of themselves (Foucault 1970: 378; Burridge 1979: 11–13), it also brings 
mainstream western scientific knowledge to its limits; to the stark 
incommensurability of other ways of thinking (Foucault 1970: 373–374, 376–378).  
Lying at the limits of the disciplines and conventional knowledge, then, culture 
continually engages with that which is apparently unknowable in conventional 
scientific terms. Regardless, for instance, of how much anthropology breaks culture 
into separate elements—language, kinship, religion and so on—culture continues 
to be a complex whole, larger than the sum of its parts, and to some extent an 
unspecifiable abstraction (Freilich 1989; Herbert 1991). This abstraction is also not 
only ‘out there’ because while it is a construction and an invention (Wagner 1975), 
culture is also of us such that it partly makes us who we are. In a curious piece of 
self-reference, the study of culture is, as Wagner shows, part of ‘our culture’ (1975: 
16) – the culture of western society and scholarship. It is for this reason that, all too 
often, scholarly attempts to understand the socio–political orders of other peoples, 
‘discovers’ whatever phenomena are necessary ‘to explain indigenous culture in 
heuristic Western terms’ (1986: xi). We tend to ask ‘”How do these people solve our 
problems within their means” rather than “How do they resolve and transform our 
meanings within their problems"’ (1986: xii). The risk, of course, is self-reference 
such that scholarship becomes a ‘moral allegory of what we consider to be 
“culture” or “society”…’ (1986: xiv). 
Yet amidst the complex challenges of etymology, intellectual history, definition 
and conceptual hijinks, culture fascinates, spawning research and attempts to 
investigate and know diverse human experiences and relationships. We do, then, 
also know a lot about ‘culture’. Anthropology has contributed a great number of 
detailed ethnographic studies spanning many decades. Moreover, from the 1980s, 
there has been an explosion of wider interest in culture (Sewell 1999: 36). 
Historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, literary theorists and 
many others have taken up the study of cultural phenomenon, not to mention the 
discipline of cultural studies. This ‘cultural turn’ is broadly concerned with the ways 
in which understandings of human sociability are mitigated or inflected by the ways 
people understand their social and physical world, and the values, beliefs and 
processes that are produced or reproduced as a result of this interaction. As 
Steinmetz states, there is a ‘general assertion of the constitutive role of culture’ 
(1999: 4).  The result is that, as Christopher Herbert (1991: 1–2) notes, the ‘principle 
that our categories of thought are … “culturally constructed” … is called upon to 
exert ever more leverage’.  
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While the folding back of culture upon the disciplines of western (social science) 
knowledge through the ‘cultural turn’ continues the intellectual struggles and 
perplexities discussed above,3 it has also been incredibly productive for bringing 
out the overall importance of culture and increasing our understanding of it. In this 
respect it seems to be clear that culture is enduring and remarkably significant to 
people, in some cases more so than anything else. Examples from around the globe 
demonstrate that in the face of threats to their culture, people are willing to 
engage in long term struggle, sometimes giving their lives, for what is often 
termed cultural recognition. Such struggles can span generations, often seeing off 
political power backed by military force. Perhaps this is because, as philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas tells us, a most serious form of violence is one that makes 
people play roles in which they cannot recognise themselves (1991: 21). If culture is 
the means through which people recognise themselves and make meaning of 
existence it perhaps takes the form of an existential good. Perhaps this is why 
culture is remarkably durable: a phenomenon that can be mobilised against 
oppressors or lay dormant to be recuperated and revitalised at a later stage. 
Even here, though, no easy conclusions are possible because the significance of 
culture does not allow us to make predictions about when and how people, 
individually or collectively, might stand firm in their culture, under what conditions 
they might access and recuperate culture, or when they might choose, in an 
apparently very different move, to ‘pass’ or dissemble, their cultural identity, 
including by combining or blending with other (perhaps more dominant) culture/s. 
These strategies cannot even be read as contrary to each other, for people 
routinely ‘pass’ their identity in order to wait for more opportune political 
circumstances to reassert or recuperate (a version of) their culture. We might draw 
a partial analogy between culture and the enigmatic neutrino particles of quantum 
physics: ubiquitous and always interacting (weakly) with other particles; very 
difficult to detect but crucial to existence.  
Culture, then, is a complicated phenomenon that challenges the human sciences 
and conventional efforts at definition. It routinely confounds conventional ways of 
knowing and is located at the frontiers of the disciplines. Culture is to some extent 
insubstantial and diaphanous, linked as it is with ineffable questions about being 
and existence. But it is also very real; a concrete force in social life that is crucial to 
human existence. If we are able to sustain a paradox, these circumstances suggest 
that we might accept, at least for the purposes of exposition pursued here, that 
culture might be both unknowable and known. In other words, rather than 
proceeding along more conventional paths of attempting to define culture and 
know it in toto, it may be more productive to explore the possibilities that culture 
may hold for global cooperation by engaging cultural difference as a phenomenon 
that is unknowable as much as knowable. To set the scene for exploring such 
possibilities, what are some of the quotidian ways in which culture has been—and is 
being—recognised as an important force in social and political life, including for 
facilitating cooperation? 
                                                          
 3 The cultural turn has perhaps brought us to the point where, as David Scott (2003) observes, 
culture has come to “resemble (in some respects at least) its old and now enfeebled 
antagonist, Reason”. 
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Culture, Change, and Cooperation  
Classic and influential studies of society and social transformation render culture 
as an intensifier of social action that enables or limits change. Perhaps most 
famously, Max Weber argued, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
that the mass emergence of certain values about work enabled the take-off of 
capitalism. Conversely, Daniel Lerner, in The Passing of the Traditional Society, a 
book which was very influential in post-WWII modernisation theory, argued that 
development efforts should, as a way to kick-start economic growth, aim to 
displace existing cultures by identifying and targeting ‘transitional’ individuals who 
exhibit entrepreneurial spirit and a commitment to reason (Lerner 1964). Others 
still see culture as a fundamental force in social and political life in somewhat 
different ways. Samuel Huntington argued that people’s cultural and religious 
identities, figured as blocs or ‘civilisations’, would be a key source of conflict in the 
post-Cold War era (1996). And Michel Maffesoli (1996) discerns, in The Time of the 
Tribes, a shift beyond both mass society and individualism in the lifestyle and 
identity politics of wealthy consumerist societies, evoking tribes in a metaphorical 
sense to evoke fragmented and small-scale social groupings such as those that 
emerge in the online world. In all cases, culture is both an important social force 
and a phenomenon that builds and sustains connections and bonds among people. 
In the early 21st Century Maffesoli’s thesis resonates beyond wealthy capitalist 
societies. Contrary to the expectations of many modernisation theorists, economic 
growth and globalisation have not seen the end of cultural difference. Although we 
have seen the spread of capitalism, cultural belonging and differentiation are very 
much alive. Indeed, we currently witness the revitalisation of cultural and religious 
traditions as one of the most significant contemporary global trends (eg., see 
Reuter and Horstmann 2012). Culture seems to be fundamental, though not at the 
level of civilisational blocs identified by Huntington. It appears that humans need 
to differentiate themselves from each other—through both longstanding historical 
or atavistic cultural identifications as well as newly crafted or emerging groupings 
such as those that emerge online—even as we are brought into closer contact with 
each other and share more and more of each other’s lives in an increasingly 
globalised world.  
The importance of culture in social life and continued cultural differentiation 
suggest the usefulness of developing ways to make culture a resource for 
cooperation not only within groups but also across cultural difference. Some fields 
are beginning this work, both by adjusting to the reality of continued cultural 
differentiation and exploring ways of making a virtue of the persistence of 
diversity. Management studies, for instance, are increasingly recognising the 
importance of diversity for strong organisations. In conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding efforts there is increased recognition of the importance of diverse 
ways of managing conflict, and a turn to local cultural resources to assist with 
conflict management and governance (eg., see Mitchell and Hancock 2012; United 
States Institute of Peace 2012). More broadly, and in response to Huntington’s 
notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’, former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami 
introduced the Dialogue among Civilizations, and from 2005 Spain and Turkey have 
led the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) (eg., see Lynch 2000; Bilgin 
2012). And while so-called ‘cultural diplomacy’ has long been used as part of public 
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diplomacy efforts to support foreign policy in instrumental ways, there are recent 
moves afoot to deploy cultural diplomacy in less partisan ways (see Gienow-Hecht 
and Donfried 2010). Players in all these fields and ventures intuit that culture is, in 
one way or another, a resource for building affiliations, connections and bonds 
among people not only within groups but also across difference—in short, that 
culture is a resource for facilitating cooperation across difference.  
The foregoing efforts, though not without critics (eg., see Bilgin 2012), evoke 
some of the most straightforward and everyday ways in which culture, as a 
powerful force in everyday social life, can be a vehicle for cooperation. Cultural 
exchange and learning of the type suggested by dialogue and cultural diplomacy, 
for instance, help an individual to see here or his own way of viewing the world as 
partial, contingent or specific. The accompanying self–reflexivity, including the 
positioning of oneself within a wider and diverse world, helps to guard against 
ethnocentrism, and develops a pool of culturally–literate players who are able to 
operate ‘in–between’ groups as brokers, negotiators and envoys. To this extent 
contemporary dialogues and exchanges share continuities with longstanding trade 
and related activities that have always played in expanding understandings and 
horizons to facilitate relations among peoples.  
Such commonsensical understanding of how culture contributes to facilitating 
relations across difference is sufficient basis for further exploring culture as a 
resource for cooperation across difference. However, such a venture invariably 
encounters the skepticism of those who see culture as a barrier rather than a 
vehicle for cooperation. Such critics might ask, , for instance, how can it be that 
culture can be a resource for building connections and cooperation among people 
when it is so often and readily mobilised as an everyday polarising force? Culture 
can be and is, it must be acknowledged, mobilised to incite conflict, create out–
groups, and dehumanize others. From this point of view, inter–cultural exchange 
should be directed toward getting beyond culture, perhaps through the 
development of a cosmopolitan ethic, rather than embracing cultural difference. 
The possibilities of cooperation from these critics, in other words, lie beyond 
cultural difference rather than in culture. For those advocating this position, reason 
typically serves as a unifying force that transcends localised cultural or other 
communitarian tendencies, and it is to reason rather than culture that we should 
turn.  
The argument of ‘culture skeptics’, though, must be set against not only the 
centrality of culture to human social life and continuing cultural differentiation 
(and thus the practical need to engage cultural difference), but also the fact that 
the most dominant and enduring forms of reason in human history are not abstract, 
decontextualised and universal but socially pluralistic and embedded (Cahoone 
2005: 210). It seems that culture endures (and thus that we have to live with and in 
it), and that reason and culture cannot be readily cast as opposites. Nonetheless, 
because culture can generate a sense of sharedness and positive connection as 
much as difference and destructive conflict, coming to terms with culture as a 
paradoxical phenomenon is a necessary preliminary task in pursuing culture as a 
potential resource for cooperation. To do so is to begin to touch upon the ways in 
which culture is unknowable.   
To engage the apparent contradiction between culture as a force for generating 
destructive conflict as well as cooperation, consider the nuance that comes with 
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commonsensical understandings of how culture contributes to facilitating relations 
across difference. When people develop self–reflexivity across difference they 
exhibit capacity to inhabit an apparent paradox: cultural others are different (and 
sometimes very significantly so, including in terms of fundamental worldviews), 
and yet this understanding also carries the realisation that cultural others are also 
fellow human beings and thus are also the same. (Vice versa, the recognition of 
sameness can serve to underscore difference.) What is crucial here is that neither 
difference nor sameness can be reduced to the other in the exchange: the fact that 
others are in some sense the same does not diminish their otherness (shared 
humanity does not trump difference) and the fact that they are different does not 
make them any less the same. Culture, it seems, is simultaneously powerful and 
diaphanous.  As Jean–Luc Nancy says, ‘[w]hat we have in common is also what 
distinguishes and differentiates us’. In his case he notes that what ‘I have in 
common with another Frenchman is the fact of not being the same Frenchman as 
him’ (Nancy 2000: 155). More broadly we might say that what makes all people 
human is the fact of not being the same humans.  
The joining of difference with sameness in cultural exchange signals how cultural 
difference is a site of exchange for generating both conflict and cooperation.  To 
think of culture as a force for only one or the other overly simplifies matters and 
neglects hitherto underappreciated ways in which culture may be a resource for 
engaging and cooperating across difference. Holding difference and sameness 
together, as occurs in inter–cultural exchanges, seems to come readily and 
naturally—indeed it is frequently naturalised to the point of invisibility. In this 
context culture speaks to the quite remarkable capacity of humans to be able to 
maintain their differences yet regularly cooperate. To this extent culture may be a 
key means through which humans navigate both difference and interdependence, 
and thus a powerful and under–recognised resource for global cooperation. 
Furthermore, the way cultural difference both dissolves into sameness and re–
forms through exchange (while perhaps being further clarified and elaborated) 
seems to resonate with an inability to know culture in a definitive way, suggesting 
that the unknowability of culture may indeed be linked with its capacity to serve as 
a resource for relating and cooperating across difference.  
Culture, then, is an acknowledged force in social change and means of building 
and sustaining bonds and connections among people. This is accepted for in–group 
dynamics, but is understandably much less established for relations and 
cooperation across difference where culture can be a cause of conflict or barrier to 
cooperation. Nonetheless, culture is both automatically and programmatically 
deployed to facilitate cooperation across difference, and to many it appears a 
commonsense vehicle for supporting collaboration. The enigmatic capacity of 
culture to bring together difference and sameness suggests that it may be an 
underappreciated resource for enabling cooperation across difference. To explore 
how culture organises and navigates between sameness and difference is one way 
of further pursuing this possibility. This is not the only way in which culture may 
facilitate cooperation but it is nonetheless an appropriate entrée because 
questions of how difference and sameness can be navigated are particularly 
charged ones for the analysis and practice of global cooperation. By way of further 
caveat, the analytical task at hand should not lead to an overstating of the case for 
culture. To understand how culture may be a resource is valuable, not least because 
culture is a central art of human social life, but it would be a mistake to, in the 
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process, turn culture into a colossal force or a determining factor in cooperation 
and conflict. The goal here is to draw out the significance of culture so that it can 
be laid alongside other factors rather than to suggest that it trumps them.    
Conjoining Difference and Sameness:  
Relational Culture  
In a quest for rigor, social science has long traded in entities and structures in the 
search for ‘laws’ of the social world. By transposing the classical Newtonian 
approach from the natural sciences to the social world, and by drawing upon 
industrial and mechanical metaphors, it has been possible to isolate objects and 
variables, to sharpen understandings, and to advance causal analyses. Early 
anthropological understandings of culture followed this broader pattern to the 
extent of identifying cultures as units, or culture in toto as a ‘thing’. And in line with 
other social sciences conceptions of political community and social grouping, 
culture was used to refer to some form of bounded group. Indeed, the idea of the 
separateness of one social group from another remains one of the important 
meanings of culture, and is probably crucial to its utility as a concept (Sewell 1999). 
However, much recent anthropological and other analysis has moved away from 
the idea of firmly separate or otherwise ‘essentialised’ cultures.  
Most contemporary understandings of culture tend to stress that cultures are not 
‘bounded’ (cultures blend and mix with each other) and that cultures are not ‘fixed’ 
(they change through time). As a result culture is typically understood as fluid and 
as linked to social processes or practices. Most commonly these are thought of in 
terms of semiotics and meaning-making, though the recent growth of interest in 
‘practices’ invokes a wide range of human ways of being and interacting beyond 
language. Cultural practices, for instance, include those that are encoded, 
embodied and enacted through bodies rather than only through speech. 
Anthropologists have led this shift in understanding through a type of auto–
critique of culture as their (previously) core object of analysis and, indeed, the 
rationale for their discipline. They have often been among the most vociferous 
critics of ‘culture’. Lila Abu–Lughod argues, for instance, that culture is a conceptual 
tool or ‘making other’ enforcing separations that inevitably carry hierarchies, and 
thus as a phenomenon that anthropologists would want to write against (1991). 
Nonetheless, culture endures both within and beyond anthropology, albeit in a 
form which radically downplays earlier understandings of cultures as units or 
things. Instead, contemporary understandings of culture emphasise fluidity and the 
emergence of cultures through the actions and interactions of both individuals and 
groups.  
The shift away from understanding culture as bounded has made space for 
recognition of the previously unrecognised—and still underappreciated—dynamic 
whereby cultures emerge at least as much through interaction among groups of 
people as through their relative isolation from each other. By drawing analogies 
with biological evolution, anthropologists and many others had previously assumed 
that cultural differences arise as groups inhabit places independently of each 
other. The commonsensical proposition here is that people evolve different ways 
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of making social meaning, gradually elaborating differences in a more or less 
spontaneous way. However, there is a now a slow but growing recognition that it is 
longstanding interaction among peoples is a key force for generating cultural 
diversity (Mair 2006; Harrison 2007). Networks of trade and warfare see exchange 
in cultural motifs and practices, including the mutual distancing of these motifs and 
practices among groups. This pattern of interaction and the creation of distinctions 
subsequently come to be recognised—and, all too often, ossified—as different 
‘cultures’ without regard for the interaction which generated difference. Cultural 
difference, in other words, is formed in relationship and hence through shared 
processes. This suggests that culture is ‘relational’.  Such a move revises earlier 
understandings of culture such that if we were to insist on accuracy it would be 
necessary to speak (somewhat clumsily) only of ‘culture-effects’. Culture (the 
entity) no longer comes first, with relations flowing from it. Culture results; it is 
secondary to relations and derived from them.    
Much anthropological analysis demonstrates the relational formation and 
maintenance of cultural difference by documenting the ways in which culture links 
(groups of) people across difference while simultaneously differentiating them 
from each other. Cultural groups navigate their ‘inside’ with the ‘outside’, marking 
aliens or others as ‘wild’ or otherwise different or threatening while simultaneously 
creating channels for periodically linking with or incorporating these same others. 
The channels for linking include warfare, marriage, extended kinship or totemic 
universalisation (extending humanity into the landscape or to animals) that 
transcends ethnic boundaries (Jackson 1998: 42). The much–noted diversity of 
culture of the region of Melanesia, for instance, arises as much out of such 
exchanges as through—as is commonly thought—the assumed isolation of tribal 
groups from each other and the wider world (Harrison 2007). Longstanding contact 
among peoples, including exchange and trade in ideas and cultural forms, allowed 
groups to articulate their differences and maintain connections such that 
individuals and groups ‘could have rights in, and affiliations to, several cultural 
identities at once’ (2007: 70). Within this system, cultures deserve to be ‘conceived 
in an imagery of transactional networks and lines of transmission rather than of 
discrete and bounded entities’ (2007: 70-71). Culture, it seems, is ambidextrous: 
able to help humans to both articulate their differences and to interact together 
across difference, carrying both differences and shared-ness.   
Understanding culture as a relational effect does indicate some sort of shared 
process, but it is necessary to be wary of overstating sameness, or of the 
temptations of a universal ‘we–identity’. While much political thought in the 
western tradition tends to see some level of shared–ness, sameness or unity as the 
basis for political community and as necessary for cooperation, difference may be 
more important than we have previously allowed. In Simon Harrison’s (2007) 
analysis, for instance, the impetus for processes of cultural differentiation arises 
because it is sameness rather than difference that presents a threat for human 
group identities; it is sameness rather than difference that creates problems. 
Building on Sigmund Freud, Rene Girard, Gregory Bateson and others, Harrison 
argues that conflict in social life arises from too much alikeness rather than, as 
much western social thought assumes, from difference. This requires, then, that 
‘social actors have a need for and therefore maintain a degree of mutual 
differentiation and distance’ (2007: 153). Harrison’s analysis suggests that 
difference, rather than sameness, is crucial to human social life and thus also to the 
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possibilities for human cooperation. Indeed, the fact that people hold strongly to 
cultural identities even in an age of intensified globalisation seems to indicate that 
while  cultural difference is formed in relationship—and hence through shared 
processes—it is no less significant for being formed in this way. 
Understanding culture as a relational effect highlights that cultural difference is 
not a natural obstacle to cooperation. Culture joins difference and sameness, 
facilitating transit between the two, so to speak. In this perspective, which offers a 
theoretical explanation for the efficacy of intercultural exchange discussed above, 
culture is a remarkable phenomenon. By holding difference and sameness together 
in dynamic relation, culture has potential to facilitate human cooperation while 
retaining and respecting human diversity.  
However, relational culture is also deeply puzzling, especially for those who 
might want to design interventions to support cooperation based upon social 
science knowledge. Relational culture is, paradoxically, both abstract and real 
because it is continually unfolding; continually coming into being. It sits, along with 
myriad relational phenomena, in an ‘unfolding relation to its own nonpresent 
potential to vary’ (Massumi 2002: 4). Relationality is thus a phenomenon not readily 
amenable to definitional or instrumental treatments. Asking ‘What is it?’ or ‘What 
can we do with it?’ is likely to lead, to the consternation of many practitioners of 
science, to mystification and perplexity rather than to clarity and a ready path for 
action. Cultural actors, meanwhile, need ask no such questions to operationalise 
culture. The social sciences are practised at asking after entities, it seems, and at 
reducing complexity to the discrete, predictable and operable, but less familiar in 
asking after everyday relations and the partly unknowable abstractions of culture. 
This poses the challenge of how tensions between entities and relations might be 
engaged, including to draw out the possibilities for supporting and facilitating 
cooperation through cultural difference. 
To contemplate the challenge of thinking relationally rather than in terms of 
entities, consider the way efforts to deal with complex and fluid social phenomena 
in recent decades have tried to grapple with relational phenomena by focusing on 
the ‘in-between’ and ‘borderzones’ through notions such as ‘hybridity’. These ideas 
have come into usage because they go some way toward capturing dynamics that 
have not been able to be grasped through conventional social science analysis.  The 
logical problem, though, is that the in-between or hybrid is a derivative effect of 
already-constituted entities. It therefore reproduces the existing state of play by 
relegating the relational to the margins. The in-between or hybrid is unable to 
stand alone. In other words, without the underlying categories to which they refer, 
the in-between and hybrid ‘vaporize into logical indeterminacy’ (Massumi 2002: 69). 
There is a need, then, to go further afield and to be more audacious.  
To embrace relationality, as Brian Massumi suggests, is to ‘give a logical 
consistency to the in-between’ (to not have it derive from pre-existing entities) and 
‘would mean realigning with a logic of relation’ (2002: 70). This requires reversing 
the prevailing priority of object over relation to focus our attention primarily on 
how entities arise or emerge through relations and processes. Ontological privilege 
would be with the relations for it is they that constitute the field of emergence 
from which entities arise (2002: 8). Culture, in this formulation, is always coming 
into existence, is always at variance with its current state as it stands in relation to 
its potential to vary or change through its relations, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’. 
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Of course, some level of fixity is also retained in this set-up. Within a relational 
approach ‘social and cultural determinations feed back into the process from which 
they arose’ (2002: 8). Nonetheless, shifting ontological commitments from entities 
to relationality gives priority to change, process and dynamism. It thus requires 
thinking dynamically rather than statically. Thinking itself must become dynamic, 
must (again) become agile and mobile. This is necessary both to grasp how the 
relations that we name as culture-effects can simultaneously produce and join 
difference, and to entertain the possibility that relational culture might be a 
resource for facilitating cooperation.  
To speak of relational culture, then, is to foreground dynamic forces in the 
formation and maintenance of culture and cultural difference. This move requires 
embracing both paradox and the partially unknowable. It asserts that culture and 
cultural difference are formed relationally—hence through shared processes—and 
yet that both are no less significant for being formed in this way. To foreground 
dynamic relations is not, of course, to say that a given culture/s does/do not exist, 
but to say that it exists in a continually ‘unfolding relation to its own nonpresent 
potential to vary’ (Massumi 2002: 4). The dynamism of culture, and the fact that it is 
difficult to define, pushes the limits of conventional social science knowledge, 
exposing scholars to relational forces that they have all–too–often tended to 
disavow in the search for more secure ontological footing. However, perhaps it is 
time to—in turn—disavow the security of conventional social science. To this 
extent, culture may, along with the contemporary turn to theories of practice, 
emergence and self–organisation, be the harbinger of more adventurous ways of 
knowing in the human sciences. Indeed, to think of culture relationally requires 
engaging more deeply with relationality per se to attempt—despite the obvious 
challenges—to understand what kind of phenomenon relationality is, including 
how it operates through human beings.   
Relationality: Affirming Interactive Dynamism 
To approach the relational is to approach a threshold of unknowability at which 
science tends to recoil. It may thus seem strange to attempt to explicate 
relationality with reference to the precise sciences, rather than through theology 
and philosophy or the traditions of non–western peoples and traditions where 
relationality is either occasionally or routinely engaged. And yet, following 
Massumi, the precise sciences are also ineluctably being drawn toward relationality. 
Science frequently resists the relational ways of being and knowing of theologians 
and indigenous peoples, and yet many sciences also approach a ‘relational limit’ as 
observations accumulate and paradigms complexify (Massumi 2002: 229). This limit 
might be thought of as an excess of dynamically generated effects, a surplus of 
events, results or forms that confound both science’s expectations about the world 
and its existing ways of knowing. Examples include the emergence of quantum 
mechanics in the first half of the twentieth century or the discovery of dissipative 
structures in thermodynamics in the late twentieth century. Recent discoveries in 
neuroscience and biological systems identify phenomena that are similarly 
challenging for conventional science: self-organising and non-predictable systems 
in which order emerges through the interaction of local ingredients (neurons in 
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brains, bird in flocks, fish in schools, bees in hives, ants in colonies) and without 
regard for linear and cause-effect analysis or proportionality of input and effect. 
The case of chaos theory serves to elucidate both science’s relationship to 
unknowable-relational phenomena and provides one entrée for understanding 
relationality in more detail. Chaos theory is a recently emerged and widely applied 
field of scientific study that describes and analyses, through detailed mathematics, 
dynamic systems that are fully determined by initial conditions and, at the same 
time, are highly sensitive yet to them. These two characteristics generate 
apparently paradoxical systems that are partly deterministic and yet unpredictable 
in the long-term. Weather patterns are the classic example. The semi-deterministic 
character of such systems holds out the hope for conventional scientific ways of 
knowing while extreme sensitivity to initial conditions confounds this same 
possibility. Chaos enables science and apparently disavows it, and it is perhaps this 
that leads to scientific efforts that vigorously pursue formal modelling and efforts 
to quantify the uncertainty factor in an attempt to bring chaos back into the 
scientific fold (Massumi 2002: 244).  
Chaos walks the threshold between what is known and unknowable in 
conventional scientific terms. As Massumi notes, the ‘still-suspect status of chaos 
theory in the eyes of the established scientific disciplines may have everything to 
do with its verging on ideas considered more ‘properly’ to be of the province of 
philosophy’, including relationality, creativity and affect (2002: 229). It seems 
reasonable to expect that conventional science might recoil at the threshold of 
unknowability brought to us by dynamically self-organising relational phenomena 
such as those we see in traffic flows, brains, crowds and throughout nature. 
Nonetheless, these phenomena call for understanding. In the process they orient 
us to ‘unknowable’ realms.   
To stay close to conventional ways of knowing in the first instance—to ease 
toward knowing the unknowable—we can approach relationality by considering 
how it speaks to ‘an expanded notion of causality’ (2002: 225). Classical linear 
understandings of cause and effect pertain to proportional impacts among locally–
acting entities or ingredients, but recent scientific work requires coming to terms 
with non–proportional system impacts resulting from extreme sensitivity to initial 
conditions in chaos theory, with non–local dynamics brought to light by quantum 
mechanics (see Nadeau and Kafatos 2001), and, more generally, with relational 
changes emerging through the coming–together of entities or ingredients in their 
dynamic unity (2002: 225). This relational type of ‘cause’ is perhaps better termed ‘a 
quasi cause, since it concerns openness rather than determination, and dynamic 
unities rather than parts’ (2002: 225). Science may be uncomfortable with a ‘quasi 
cause’ and yet such a phenomenon is no less significant for not being able to be 
pinned down in the terms of conventional scientific knowledge. To be sure, it is 
precisely not possible to refer to a ‘relational cause’, and there is no question here 
of being for or against science. Science is an incredibly powerful way of knowing 
the world, and yet relational phenomena are both known and unknown by science; 
they are understood by and yet also exceed conventional scientific ways of 
knowing.  
While there is no possibility of strictly saying what relationality is—of defining or 
otherwise knowing it in conventional scientific terms—the unknowable dimension 
which chaos and other scientific developments open onto does help to better 
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understand relationality and, perhaps, to work with it. Working from a conventional 
scientific base, we might say that relationality is the ‘potential for singular effects 
of qualitative change to occur [in a system of interactions] in excess over or as a 
supplement to objective interactions [of the cause-effect type historically 
discerned by science]’ (2002: 225). In Rayleigh–Bénard convection, a layer of liquid 
between two horizontal planes chaotically dissipates the heat that is applied from 
below until the random microscopic movement in the liquid becomes 
spontaneously ordered, self-organising into an macroscopic ordered population of 
convection cells (2002: 224). In a mediation process among parties to a conflict, 
tension increases until an apparently insignificant piece of information or exchange 
sees the emergence of a new pattern of interactions that unfolds and processes 
prior tensions and difficulties.  
Such events evoke the unknowable–relational dimension beyond conventional 
science. And yet understanding relationality requires more because referring to 
such a ‘beyond’ does not tell us much about the quality of relationality. Two further 
ingredients are crucial. First, the qualitative change among ingredients or 
participants requires that interactions underway are open ‘to being affected by 
something new’ (2002: 224). Relationality thus involves both openness and affect, 
reflecting not just the possibility of change but an orientation and predisposition 
toward it. Second, the qualitative change arises dynamically in ways that involve 
some type of contagion, mutual susceptibility or, minimally, transmission of 
information leading to behavioural effects that reflect the changes afoot in the 
whole. Relationality thus allows, as exemplified in Rayleigh–Bénard convection 
experiments, the whole to become something else while continuing to be what it 
is. (The relational quasi cause, as might be expected, works in paradoxical ways).  
To return to culture to exemplify, individuals of a given culture may be involved in 
reconfiguring power hierarchies internal to their cultural group, modifying motifs 
and practices following inspiration from beyond the immediate context, or 
incorporating technologies produced and circulated through global capitalism. 
These events, proceeding through openness, affect, and relational quasi–cause, 
often involve substantial personal and cultural transformation. Nonetheless in 
these processes we see the maintenance of both individual senses of self and the 
wider sense of culture. This involves the simultaneous dissolution and preservation 
of cultural difference. The possibilities of this pattern for global cooperation are 
more obvious at the larger scale of inter–cultural interaction. In processes of 
intercultural exchange, people are invariably changed by their experience.  From 
the vantage of their culture, people become part of a wider and larger whole in 
interactions with others while also remaining who they are. To be sure, they may 
subsequently resettle again, changed and yet the same, into their prior cultural 
identity. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of becoming something else while 
continuing to remain the same involves a qualitatively singular event: a being–in–
relation or coming–together through dynamic interaction that mixes already–
ordered interaction (in the form of cultural identities) with openness and possibility 
for change. In this way cultural difference both affirms and transcends itself.  
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Culture, Relationality, and Cooperation: 
Possible Directions 
A wide range of players in global affairs broadly endorse the notion that cross–
cultural exchanges can and do contribute to enhanced global cooperation. Formal 
governmental and inter–governmental organisations as well as their civilian and 
non-governmental counterparts facilitate and support programs for cross–cultural 
interaction and dialogue to enhance tolerance and understanding. At the everyday 
level too, good personal relationships among individual officials, necessarily 
established through cross–cultural engagement, are crucial for the smooth 
functioning of international affairs. Of course, it remains the case that the 
possibilities that cultural exchange might suggest for global cooperation currently 
tend to be either trumped or obscured by ‘harder’ conceptualisations of 
international public life, whether they have their base in realist theories of 
international relations or technocratic formulations of global governance. 
Nonetheless, the fact that foreign ministries and other agencies provide broad 
support for cultural exchange and similar programs suggests that these efforts 
cannot be wholly reduced to an expression of ‘soft power’ undertaken in the 
prosecution of a competitive game of power relations. In short, there exists a broad 
intuition, supported by experiences of cross–cultural engagement, that culture—
including cultural difference—is a vehicle for facilitating interaction across 
difference and supporting global cooperation.  
The explication of culture as a relational phenomenon, building upon culture 
scholarship of recent decades and working through the partial unknowabilty of 
culture, helps to theorise the foregoing intuition about cultural exchange. In the 
relational schema developed here, culture is ambidextrous, helping humans to both 
articulate their differences and to interact together across difference. Relationality 
foregrounds culture’s paradoxical qualities by acknowledging that culture and 
cultural difference are formed dynamically through shared processes and that the 
difference thus–formed is no less significant for being formed in this way. 
Consistent with the persistence of cultural differentiation despite modernisation 
and globalisation, relationality suggests that dynamically formed cultural 
difference may be more important than had previously been anticipated. Indeed, in 
partial and paradoxical contrast to familiar moves that seek out unity or shared–
ness as the basis for global cooperation, that which human beings and human 
groups share at a very fundamental level may be our desire—and processes—for 
creating difference; differences which continually re–form in dynamic relation.  
In the theoretical analysis offered here, culture and relationality are intimately 
bound. Culture is a relational phenomenon and relationality offers a way of 
modulating culture; of respecting cultural difference and yet allowing that culture 
is a shared human resource. Relationality also has wider application beyond cultural 
phenomena, and yet to the extent that relationality generates benefits it 
challenges conventional ways of knowing in the western tradition. Engaging 
relationality brings us to the limits of conventional science, exposing us to excesses 
of dynamically generated non-linear and unpredictable effects that confound 
science’s conventional expectations about the world. Relational phenomena 
involve the contagion, mutual susceptibility or transmission of information among 
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interacting ingredients or parts, leading to dynamic changes in the whole; changes 
that allow both the ingredients of a whole and the whole itself to become 
something else while continuing to be the same. 
A relational approach, then, might be a basis for extending understandings and 
analyses of global interactions and cooperation across cultural difference in order 
to better understand both the force of culture and dynamics of cooperation in 
ways that are more attuned to the interplay of difference and sameness than has 
hitherto been the case. As noted earlier, though, there is a need to be cautious 
about overstating of the case for culture. While culture is a central art of human 
social life, culture is not an overwhelming or determining factor in cooperation and 
conflict, and the relational analysis and possibilities offered here join with rather 
than displace other understandings of social and international life.    
 Although the possibilities for knowing relationality currently lie at the limits of 
current knowledge, concrete starting points are also available. Perhaps the most 
obvious entrée, as indicated in this paper, involves drawing upon theory and 
analysis from the limits of the precise sciences—chaos theory, emergence and self–
organisation, for instance—as source and inspiration for theorising about and 
analysing social, cultural and political dynamics. Some anthropologists have begun 
the work of bridging between the hard and social sciences (e.g., Mosko and Damon 
2005) as have cultural theorists and philosophers (eg Massumi) and some 
sociologists (e.g., Urry 2003). However, those working in fields most obviously and 
closely related to global cooperation—political science, international relations, 
global governance—have not yet made significant inroads in drawing upon chaos 
and similar theories or taking up the broader relational turn. There are, 
nevertheless, exceptions and early efforts (e.g., see Cederman 1997; Jackson and 
Nexon 1999; Nexon 2010; Wendt 2010), including in the sub–field of peace and 
conflict resolution (e.g., see Coleman 2011; Hendrick 2009; Kuttner 2012).  
Most existing social science engagements with the hard science have not yet, 
though, been applied to global cooperation and they need to be further developed 
for this purpose, both through theorising and empirical analysis. To the extent that 
non–linear and emergent phenomena are beginning to be countenanced in 
considerations of global cooperation, they primarily come from the hard sciences 
or highly interdisciplinary settings that are linked to addressing the challenge of 
global climate change (e.g., see Vasconcelos, Santos et al. 2013). There are, once 
again, exceptions, including emerging efforts to tackle the challenges of global 
cooperation by linking with the behavioural sciences, including complexity theory 
(see Messner, Guarín et al. 2013). In short, there is great scope for social sciences 
scholarship to work with ideas of relationality by taking inspiration from the limits 
of the hard sciences to explore possibilities for analysing and facilitating global 
cooperation.   
The limits of science, though, are only one type of limit, operating as they do 
within a certain way of knowing and relating to the world that has emerged and 
become dominant in contemporary research and scholarship. This is not to 
relativise or diminish this very powerful way of knowing, or to challenge the 
apparently superior purchase it has on knowing our world. But it is the case that 
science does not know everything—as it itself demonstrates—and that there are 
other ways of knowing that might be drawn upon. Relational phenomena such as 
the co–emergence of selves are explored in various strands of western philosophy 
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from pragmatism to existential phenomenology as well as in elements of 
philosophical anthropology and a variety of religious and philosophical traditions. 
Many cultural traditions around the globe also embrace relational phenomena, 
including through mythology and ways of knowing and being that accept—and 
indeed celebrate—indeterminacy, form–changing, and the polyvalence of meaning. 
To this extent, many peoples who have previously been maligned and excluded 
from global conversations on account of various ‘lacks’ in large part defined 
through western knowledge are subtle masters of relationality. Moreover, these 
three sets of knowledge resources—philosophy, religion, and cultural difference—
are a vast reserve that may be drawn upon in combination with the resources of the 
precise sciences. 
Brian Massumi (2002: 229) argues that ‘relationality is nigh’ across a wide range of 
scientific fields, and relationality is certainly also burgeoning in the social sciences. 
But to better understand relationality requires significant investment in knowing a 
phenomenon that does not offer clarity of the sort we have come to expect in 
science. Relationality is relatively new and remarkably challenging for conventional 
ways of knowing, none of which necessarily lose relevance because of the advent 
of relationality. It is—at least for many at this juncture—both conceptually difficult 
and an affront to the agency that has come to expected through conventional ways 
of knowing. There are also more practical challenges. While it is possible to 
theorise and analyse relationality as a phenomenon, this does not, unlike in many 
other areas of science and scholarship, provide a secure platform for prediction or 
instrumental action. Relational dynamics are concrete and real and yet relationality, 
like culture, is in some senses diaphanous. Relational phenomena can be observed, 
but when one attempts to grasp relationality to turn it to one’s ends it slips 
through one’s fingers. Nonetheless, if Massumi (2002) is correct about the rise of 
relationality, the work of knowing relationality, already underway, will gather pace 
as an effect of efforts to extend the boundaries of current knowledge.  
The current scientific and scholarly state of play as well as the characteristics of 
relationality itself suggests a dual strategy of both extending understanding 
relationality as a socio–cultural phenomenon in itself and developing applied 
knowledge about the use of relationality in the pursuit of global cooperation, 
including through cultural difference. It makes sense to approach relationality 
conventionally; to attempt to know it by deploying reason, theorising, and 
empirical analysis. Conversely, relationality might be also known in unconventional 
ways, through feeling and imagination for instance, and thus by deploying faculties 
unfamiliar to—and usually eschewed—in science and scholarship. Relationality 
might be usefully approached obliquely, indirectly, and with openness to being 
surprised from unexpected quarters; it calls to be approached both head on and 
circuitously, both in extending our knowledge of it and in exploring ways to deploy 
it to address the challenge of global cooperation. 
The task of drawing upon relationality to directly facilitate global cooperation can 
be stated quite straightforwardly. It requires deploying relationality to engage 
already ordered interactions that tend to impede or block cooperation (typically 
political, social, economic, or cultural institutional set–ups of one sort or another) in 
such a way as to reopen their interactive coming–together, exposing them to 
relational quasi causality of dynamic unity in ways that are oriented toward 
cooperation. Undertaking this work requires making arguments and proposals on a 
range of fronts to engage with current institutional set–ups, from manifestations 
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of cultural and religious identity to political and governance architecture and ways 
of conceptualising political community and cooperation itself. It necessarily flows 
through the human sciences, particularly the disciplines most closely related to 
global cooperation—political science, international relations, global governance—
and thus requires, as indicated above, the further development of relational 
approaches in a range of disciplines.  
Nonetheless, it is also possible to point, in particular, to opportunities to draw 
upon cultural difference and relationality to analyse and extend concrete practices 
for supporting global cooperation. In recent decades a range of practices that are 
largely directed at the task of generating relational and cooperative effects have 
been developed in the field of conflict resolution. Mediation, facilitation, dialogue 
processes, and problem–solving workshops all work with interactions among 
parties to assist them to reconfigure relationships—both with each other and to 
the issues they share—in a cooperative mode. Although the dynamics of these 
processes have been studied to some extent, much remains to be done, particularly 
to understand transformative or critical moments; exchanges in which apparently 
remarkable and inexplicable shifts in dynamics progress the process to a new stage 
or overcome an apparently intractable obstacle.  These phenomena, which lead 
many practitioners to argue that running such practices is as much art as science, 
particularly across cultural difference, deserve to be theorised and observed 
through a relational lens. Some of this work has begun, with relationality beginning 
to be taken up in the conflict resolution field alongside ideas of complexity, 
emergence and self–organisation (eg., Jones and Hughes 2003; Hendrick 2009; 
Körppen, Ropers et al. 2011). Taking these developments further promises to make 
a contribution to understanding of how to directly facilitate and support broader 
cooperation efforts through established conflict resolution processes. 
Culture and cultural difference take us to edge of conventional scholarly ways of 
knowing but also provides unique opportunities. At the limits of current ways of 
knowing, culture is both ‘relational’ and an example of a wider phenomenon of 
‘relationality’ which foregrounds relations over entities, becoming over being, and 
dynamism over fixity. Theorising culture as a relational phenomenon respects 
cultural difference while allowing that culture is a shared human resource for 
pursuing cooperation. To this extent, relationality modulates culture, 
demonstrating how culture simultaneously differentiates and joins human beings. 
Meanwhile, relationality also reveals, beyond the culture question per se, the limits 
of conventional western knowledge. This provides opportunities for theorising and 
analysing a wide range of social and political interactions relating to current 
cooperation challenges, including examination of how ingredients or parts of 
systems can interact in ways that lead to dynamic changes that are oriented toward 
cooperation. Engaging relationality, whether through the limits of the precise 
sciences, philosophy, religion or by drawing upon other cultural traditions, thus 
offers hitherto underappreciated ways that may help us to engage and meet 
contemporary global cooperation challenges.  
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